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“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.”  – Benjamin N. Cardozo
I. Introduction
There are two kinds of “intellectual property” scholars: those who use scare quotes and those who don’t.
Some scholars believe that intellectual property is just another kind of property, which the law should treat the
same as any other kind of property.[4] But others believe that “intellectual property” has little or nothing in
common with physical property and see the term “property” as little more than a misleading metaphor.[5] The
disagreement between these two schools of thought is probably strongest when it comes to trademarks, which
lack many of the “property–like” features of patents and copyrights, most notably alienability.
Adam Mossoff is decidedly in the property camp.  In his provocative but rather quixotic essay, “Trademark as
a Property Right,” he claims that trademark simply “is” a property right. He observes that trademark can be
conceptualized as a form of property right and notes that when 19th century courts initially created trademark
doctrine, they often relied on analogies to physical property.[7] Mossoff shows that many features of historical
and contemporary trademark doctrine can be analogized to use–rights in physical property, especially
easements appurtenant and riparian rights.[8] Accordingly, he argues that trademarks should be de ned as a
form of use–rights, and receive similar treatment.
I agree with Mossoff’s descriptive claim that trademarks can be and have been analogized to certain forms of
physical property rights. His doctrinal and historical arguments are compelling. But the fact that courts have
analogized trademarks to use–rights in the past does not obligate them to continue using the analogy.[10] And
the fact that trademarks can be analogized to use–rights does not imply that courts must rely on that analogy. 
It depends on your theory of trademarks.
People can and do reasonably disagree about whether and why trademarks are justi ed. Consequentialist
theories hold that trademarks are a means to an end, and deontological theories hold that trademarks are an
end in themselves.[11]
Mossoff’s normative claims are decidedly deontological— speci cally Lockean. He argues that business
owners are entitled to own trademarks associated with the commercial goodwill they labored to create.[12] But
consequentialist theories don’t ask whether people are entitled to own trademarks. They ask whether good
things happen when people are allowed to assert trademark rights.
Accordingly, whether you  nd Mossoff’s normative claims appealing will depend on your own normative
premises. He is unlikely to convince consequentialists, unless he convinces them to change their premises.
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Mossoff’s essay also makes an epistemological claim, arguing that we should analogize trademarks to use–
rights because it will help us better understand how trademarks can and should work.[13] Is he right? Maybe. At
the very least, his analogy has some purchase on trademark history and doctrine. Surely, both deontological
and consequentialist theories can bene t from a more robust understanding of the historical development of
trademark law. But it is unclear how “tradition” could provide any consequentialist justi cation for trademark
doctrines that produce undesirable results.
 
II. Mossoff’s “Property Theory” of Trademarks
As he must, Mossoff recognizes that the prevailing theory of trademarks is utilitarian.  The overwhelming
majority of courts and scholars assume that a trademark is “a regulatory entitlement whose function is to
increase social welfare by reducing consumer search costs.”  In theory, modern trademark law “amounts to
little more than industrial policy.”  However, the paradigmatic problem with trademark doctrine is its failure to
regulate competition e ciently.
Mossoff objects to the utilitarian theory of trademarks. He argues that trademarks can and should be “de ned
as a property right.”  Or rather, he argues that courts and scholars should adopt a Lockean theory of
trademarks and conceptualize trademarks as a kind of “property” right analogous to physical property rights.
Mossoff begins by explicitly rejecting utilitarianism and proclaiming his fealty to the “Lockean property
theory.”  He then observes that the historiography of trademark law is dominated by the utilitarian
perspective.[20] While contemporary trademark scholars generally recognize that 19th century courts often
adopted a “goodwill–as–property” theory of trademark, they describe a gradual transition to an “unfair
competition” theory of trademark.  Mossoff disagrees, arguing that trademarks can and should be described
in Lockean terms.
While Mossoff disclaims any intention to provide an “intellectual history” of trademark law, he traces the origin
of trademark law to the emergence of the concept of commercial goodwill in the early 19th century.  He
argues that 19th century courts and scholars de ned goodwill as the “reputational value” of a commercial
enterprise and saw trademarks as a way of using that goodwill.  In other words, they saw the exclusive right
to use a trademark as a function of the exclusive right to own the goodwill associated with a commercial
enterprise.  This is consistent with Lockean property theory, which de nes property as “the right to exclusive
use of the fruits of one’s productive labors.”  Goodwill is property because it consists of an exclusive right to
the reputational value of a commercial enterprise. But what about trademarks?
According to Mossoff, trademarks are also property, albeit a different kind of property. He argues that
trademarks are a form of “use–right” or “usufruct” inherent in commercial goodwill.  In property law, a use–
right is a property right “necessarily derived from or attached to an accompanying property right.”  If goodwill
is a property right, and trademarks inhere in goodwill, then trademarks are analogous to a use–right in goodwill.
Mossoff explains his use–right theory of trademarks by analogy to paradigmatic use–rights like riparian rights
and easements appurtenant.  An easement appurtenant is “a use–right derived from and attached to a
dominant estate that permits use of another servient estate.”  For example, a right to cross someone else’s
land in order to reach your own land is an easement appurtenant. Mossoff argues that a trademark is a
property right “appurtenant” to commercial goodwill because it consists in an exclusive right to use a mark, but
only in relation to the commercial goodwill it signi es.
Mossoff shows that courts have routinely referred to trademarks as “property” rights “appurtenant” to goodwill.
 He shows that it is possible to analogize particular features of trademark doctrine to the property doctrine
of easements appurtenant. For example, the owner of an easement appurtenant cannot convey it separately
from the estate to which it is attached, because doing so would transform it into an “easement in gross.”
Likewise, a trademark owner cannot convey it separately from the goodwill to which it is attached, because
doing so would transform it into a “trademark in gross.”  Moreover, like all use–rights, a trademark exists and
is enforceable only insofar as it is actually used in commerce.
As Mossoff observes, this parallelism is obviously not a coincidence. Courts describe trademarks in terms of
use–rights because they derived trademark doctrine in substantial part from the doctrine of use–rights.
Accordingly, he argues that courts and scholars should continue to analogize trademarks to use–rights. By
implication, he argues that they should adopt a theory of trademarks modeled on the Lockean property theory
rather than a utilitarian theory.
 
III. Trademark “Ownership” & Its Discontents
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I found this essay intriguing, but also puzzling. Mossoff convincingly shows that trademarks can be analogized
to use–rights in physical property. He provides a compelling argument that the viability of that analogy is not an
accident, but a function of the historical development of trademark doctrine. In other words, trademarks
resemble use–rights because courts modeled them on use–rights.
But he wants to do more. He wants to show that trademark “is” a property right. Rather, he wants to show that
trademarks should be de ned as a kind of “property” and afforded the same kinds of exclusive rights as
physical property.
He does not achieve that goal. And I do not see how he possibly could, given the nature of his claims.
Mossoff argues that the utilitarian account of trademarks as regulatory entitlements that promote consumer
welfare is wrong, because trademarks look like use–rights, and trademark doctrine sprung from the brow of
property doctrine.[38] But that misses the point. The project of utilitarianism is not to describe the law as it is,
but as it should be. Utilitarians can cheerfully concede all of Mossoff’s points, because they do not care about
legal doctrine for its own sake— they care about its results. In other words, Mossoff cannot effectively
challenge the utilitarian theory of trademarks because he is not speaking its language.
Mossoff explicitly endorses the Lockean theory of property, which provides that people are entitled to exclusive
ownership of the fruits of their labor.[40] If one accepts the Lockean theory of property, it follows that people
are entitled to own anything analogous to Lockean property, including trademarks associated with the goodwill
in their business.
But utilitarians are consequentialists, who reject Mossoff’s Lockean premise. According to utilitarians, property
is purely instrumental, and the purpose of trademarks is only to increase net social welfare. While Mossoff’s
arguments will surely speak to those who accept the Lockean theory of property, it is not clear whether they
have anything to offer utilitarians, at least with respect to his normative claims.
Indeed, as Mossoff recognizes, other trademark scholars have identi ed the historical use of commercial
goodwill as a justi cation for conceptualizing trademarks as a form of property.  Those scholars argued that
the use of “property” metaphors gradually diminished as utilitarian premises began to dominate trademark
theory. Mossoff makes a convincing case that trademarks were not actually conceptualized as property in
goodwill but “use–rights appurtenant to” goodwill.  From a utilitarian standpoint, who cares? It just doesn’t
matter what kind of property metaphor you use if the metaphors lead to bad results.
 
IV. Trademark as Metaphor
Mossoff also makes a valuable contribution by showing that trademarks can be and have been analogized to
use–rights in physical property. Whether or not you think trademarks should resemble use–rights, it may be a
helpful way of describing trademark doctrine and how it has evolved over time.
Legal reasoning loves analogies. Indeed, analogical reasoning is arguably the paradigmatic form of common
law legal reasoning.  The very concept of “precedent” requires analogical reasoning. If a case supplies a rule,
analogical reasoning enables a court to apply the rule.
And yet, analogical reasoning has both strengths and weaknesses.  It can clarify by enabling people to
express ideas more e ciently and effectively. Nothing is more rhetorically powerful than a compelling analogy.
But it can also obscure by encouraging people to ignore the practical consequences of adopting a policy. A
powerful analogy can normalize an objectively undesirable outcome. Analogies are valuable when they
facilitate the expression of an unfamiliar concept in familiar terms. They are dangerous when they enable the
use of familiar terms to justify bad decisions.
As I have previously explained, intellectual property metaphors are often unhelpful.  Accordingly, the question
is whether Mossoff’s analogy to use–rights clari es or obscures our understanding of trademarks.  I am
convinced that his analogy helps to clarify our understanding of the historical development of trademark
doctrine and why it has adopted certain principles, including the rejection of “trademarks in gross.” But I am not
convinced that it helps to clarify our understanding of what trademarks should look like today.
Mossoff’s analogy probably helps explain why most people think trademarks are justi ed. He is hardly alone in
accepting Lockean property theory. While utilitarianism dominates the academy, Lockeanism surely dominates
the electorate. And Mossoff provides a convincing explanation of why people who accept Lockeanism tend to
think trademarks are normatively justi ed. He makes explicit a previously unarticulated analogical relationship
and helps explain why trademark law took its present form.
But is that form justi ed? If you accept Mossoff’s Lockean theory of property, then you should ask whether
contemporary trademark doctrine is justi ed as a way of protecting a legitimate right to the fruits of labor.
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Whether trademarks resemble use–rights in physical property seems entirely irrelevant. Surely, under Lockean
property theory, the justi cation for a property right depends on its intrinsic, metaphysical qualities, not merely
its similarity to some other property right. Maybe trademarks are justi ed on Lockean terms, but can a mere
analogy actually prove it?
By contrast, if you accept a utilitarian theory of property, then Mossoff’s entire normative premise is irrelevant.
As a practical and political matter, utilitarians should pay attention to why Lockeans think trademarks are
justi ed. But they have no reason to accept those justi cations. For utilitarians, Mossoff’s analogy simply
provides a helpful way of explaining how trademark law went wrong. If the purpose of trademark doctrine is to
enshrine ine cient and unjusti ed property metaphors where they do not belong, then utilitarians should
happily discard it in favor of more e cient doctrines.
 
5. Conclusion
 In sum, Mossoff’s essay makes a valuable contribution to scholarship on Lockean theories of intellectual
property. Speci cally, his use–right analogy provides a helpful way for Lockean theorists to explain how
trademarks  t into a Lockean framework. But Mossoff’s analogy does not and cannot show that trademarks
must be conceptualized in Lockean terms. For utilitarians who believe that trademarks are merely a means to
the end of promoting consumer welfare, Mossoff’s analogy is of formal and historical interest, but no more.
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